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Topic Summary

Posted by: devnullius
« on: 14. December 2013., 11:42:34 »

 :bih:

I was only hoping for something more Hollywood-like. With Leonardo DiCaprio or something. Maybe even with some romantic interests interwoven... Something like "Hackers" - loved that one!  :>

D
Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 10:18:29 »

Have you try to search on YouTube?  ;)

http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Attacking+Tor%3A+how+the+NSA+targets+users&sm=12

A interesting movie I found their:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MqvSEQ7jmeY


One other for them who did not know. ;)

How the NSA uses cellphone tracking to find and 'develop' targets
http://youtu.be/-rTr6PfEVwg

Can the Tor browser (or anything) Really Keep Your Web Activities
http://youtu.be/3uIAlByKorM

Snowden Leak: NSA Targeted Tor Users' Anonymity
http://youtu.be/QuWyim1cPis

TOR is Safe No More!
http://youtu.be/95QfumZMerM

Posted by: devnullius
« on: 14. December 2013., 09:40:29 »

Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users' online anonymity anyone who sees them would not be suspicious. An example of one such tag [LINK REMOVED]

WTF? I wanna SEE! And visit! :>

VERY interesting read... Reads like an exciting movie I would LOVE to watch. I would even PAY for it in an official, registered cinema ;p

Up until know the technical secrets that came out, did not surprise me very much. Already in the 90s I thought about "internet" and "spying" a lot. Especially on how one would do it and how secure I wouldn't be if "one" had full access to the backbone.

Things I did not could have thought of are the MASSIVE scale this operates on! If they would only use this power to mine bitcoins... :s Or peaceful operations in general

What truly surprised me was the time-shifting trick. Yeah I know it's man-in-the-middle, but I found it a very special kind of "man"  there in that middle. Why? Cause it's solely based on being faster.

Very smart all in all :( I'm impressed; truly some geniuses @ NSA. Luckily, they were also very arrogant. And arrogance... Always leads to a fall ;p See Blatter. Kim Un.* ...

PEACE! God damn't :(

devnullius


* in Dutch, "Un" is pronounced "oen" - meaning "morron". If you look at Kim's face... Yeah, it seems about right ;p
Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 09:03:38 »

Quantum Spying: GCHQ Used Fake LinkedIn Pages to Target Engineers



Officials at LinkedIn say they "would not authorize such activity for any purpose".

Elite GCHQ teams targeted employees of mobile communications companies and billing companies to gain access to their company networks. The spies used fake copies of LinkedIn profiles as one of their tools.

The Belgacom employees probably thought nothing was amiss when they pulled up their profiles on LinkedIn, the professional networking site. The pages looked the way they always did, and they didn't take any longer than usual to load.

 The victims didn't notice that what they were looking at wasn't the original site but a fake profile with one invisible added feature: a small piece of malware that turned their computers into tools for Britain's GCHQ intelligence service.

The British intelligence workers had already thoroughly researched the engineers. According to a "top secret" GCHQ presentation disclosed by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, they began by identifying employees who worked in network maintenance and security for the partly government-owned Belgian telecommunications company Belgacom.

Then they determined which of the potential targets used LinkedIn or Slashdot.org, a popular news website in the IT community.

'Quantum Insert'

The computers of these "candidates" were then infected with computer malware that had been placed using infiltration technology the intelligence agency refers to as "Quantum Insert," which enabled the GCHQ spies to deeply infiltrate the Belgacom internal network and that of its subsidiary BICS, which operates a so-called GRX router system. This type of router is required when users make calls or go online with their mobile phones while abroad.

SPIEGEL's initial reporting on "Operation Socialist," a GCHQ program that targeted Belgacom, triggered an investigation by Belgian public prosecutors. In addition, two committees of the European Parliament are investigating an attack by a European Union country on the leading telecommunications provider in another EU member state.

The operation is not an isolated case, but in fact is only one of the signature projects of an elite British Internet intelligence hacking unit working under the auspices of a group called MyNOC, or "My Network Operations Centre." MyNOCs bring together employees from various GCHQ divisions to cooperate on especially tricky operations. In essence, a MyNOC is a unit that specializes in infiltrating foreign networks. Call it Her Majesty's hacking service, if you like.

When GCHQ Director Iain Lobban appeared before the British parliament last Thursday, he made an effort to reassure lawmakers alarmed by recent revelations. British intelligence couldn't exactly stand back and watch the United Kingdom be targeted for industrial espionage, Lobban said. But, he noted, only those whose activities pose a threat to the national or economic security of the United Kingdom could in fact be monitored by his agency.

A Visit from Charles and Camilla

Even members of the royal family occasionally stop by to see what British intelligence is up to. In one photo that appears in a secret document, Charles, the Prince of Wales, and his wife Camilla, the Duchess of Cornwall, are shown listening to a presentation at a MyNOC workstation called "A Space." The tongue-in-cheek caption reads "Interlopers in A Space."

The presentation does not indicate the extent to which the royal family is kept abreast of current espionage operations. Their last visit was reportedly about Afghanistan, not Belgium. But the visit had been to the same location where what the secret document described as the "very successful" operation against Belgacom as well as "Operation Wylekey," also run by a MyNOC unit, had been conducted.

This also relates to an issue that the British have made a focal point of their intelligence-gathering activities: the most comprehensive access possible to worldwide mobile networks, the critical infrastructures for the digital age.

Mobile networks are a blessing and a curse for spies worldwide. Because each major wireless communications company operates its own networks, tapping into them becomes more complex. On the other hand, the mobile multi-use devices in our pockets are a blessing, because they often reveal more personal information than stationary computers, such as the user's lifestyle habits and location. They can also be transformed into bugging devices that can be activated remotely at any time to listen in on the user's conversations.

Mobile Phones Become Monitoring Tools

"We can locate, collect, exploit (in real time where appropriate) high value mobile devices & services in a fully converged target centric manner," a GCHQ document from 2011 states. For years, the British spies have aspired to potentially transform every mobile phone on the planet into a monitoring tool that could be activated at any time.

But the government hackers apparently have to employ workarounds in order to infiltrate the relatively inaccessible mobile phone networks.

According to the presentation, in the case of Belgacom this involved the "exploitation of GRX routers," from which so-called man-in-the-middle attacks could be launched against the subjects' smartphones. "This way, an intelligence service could read the entire Internet communications of the target and even track their location or implant spying software on their device," mobile networks expert Philippe Langlois says of the development. It is an effective approach, Langlois explains, since there are several hundred wireless companies, but only about two dozen GRX providers worldwide.

But this isn't the only portal into the world of global mobile communications that GCHQ has exploited. Another MyNOC operation, "Wylekey," targets "international mobile billing clearinghouses."

These clearinghouses, which are relatively unknown to the general public, process international payment transactions among wireless companies, giving them access to massive amounts of connection data.

The GCHQ presentation, which SPIEGEL was able to view, contains a list of the billing companies that are on the radar of the British. At the top of the list are Comfone, a company based in Bern, Switzerland, and Mach, which has since been split into two companies, one owned by another firm called Syniverse and another called Starhome Mach. Syniverse was also on the list of companies to monitor. Together, these companies dominate the industry worldwide. In the case of Mach, the GCHQ personnel had "identified three network engineers" to target. Once again, the Quantum Insert method was deployed.

The spies first determine who works for a company identified as a target, using open source data like the LinkedIn professional social networking site. IT personnel and network administrators are apparently of particular interest to the GCHQ attackers, because their computers can provide extensive access privileges to protected corporate infrastructures.

Targeting an Innocent Employee

In the case of Mach, for example, the GCHQ spies came across a computer expert working for the company's branch in India. The top-secret document shows how extensively the British intelligence agents investigated the life of the innocent employee, who is listed as a "target" after that.
 
 A complex graph of his digital life depicts the man's name in red crosshairs and lists his work computers and those he uses privately ("suspected tablet PC"). His Skype username is listed, as are his Gmail account and his profile on a social networking site. The British government hackers even gained access to the cookies on the unsuspecting victim's computers, as well as identifying the IP addresses he uses to surf the web for work or personal use.
 
In short, GCHQ knew everything about the man's digital life, making him an open book for its spies. SPIEGEL has contacted the man, but to protect his privacy is not publishing his name.

But that was only the preparatory stage. After mapping the man's personal data, now it was time for the attack department to take over. On the basis of this initial information, the spies developed digital attack weapons for six Mach employees, described in the document as "six targeting packs for key individuals," customized for the victims' computers.


Original article: By SPIEGEL Staff



Part 2: GCHQ Wants To Make Mobile Web an All-Seeing Surveillance Machine

In an article in Britain's Guardian newspaper, American IT security expert Bruce Schneier describes in detail how Quantum Insert technology is used to place malware. Apparently, the agencies use high-speed servers located at key Internet switching points. When a target calls up a specific website, such as LinkedIn, these servers are activated. Instead of the desired website, they supply an exact copy, but one that also smuggles the government hackers' spying code onto the target computers.

According to other secret documents, Quantum is an extremely sophisticated exploitation tool developed by the NSA and comes in various versions. The Quantum Insert method used with Belgacom is especially popular among British and US spies. It was also used by GCHQ to infiltrate the computer network of OPEC's Vienna headquarters.

The injection attempts are known internally as "shots," and they have apparently been relatively successful, especially the LinkedIn version. "For LinkedIn the success rate per shot is looking to be greater than 50 percent," states a 2012 document.

Much like the Belgacom spying operation, Wylekey is considered a great success. According to a summary, it provided GCHQ with detailed information about Mach, its communications infrastructure, its business profile and various key individuals.

Another document indicates that the operation yielded much more than that. In addition to "enhanced knowledge of the various clearinghouses, their customers," it also provided "knowledge of and access to encrypted links between the clearinghouses and various mobile network operators."

Interim reports on the course of the Belgacom operation were even more enthusiastic, concluding that the British spies had penetrated "deep into the network" of the Belgian company and were "at the edge of the network." This enabled the British internal encryption specialists ("Crypt Ops") to launch their "Operation Socialist II," so as to crack the encrypted connections, or VPNs.

'LinkedIn Would Not Authorize Such Activity'

When contacted, LinkedIn stated that the company takes the privacy and security of its members "very seriously" and "does not sanction the creation or use of fake LinkedIn profiles or the exploitation of its platform for the purposes alleged in this report." "To be clear," the company continued, "LinkedIn would not authorize such activity for any purpose." The company stated it "was not notified of the alleged activity."

A spokesman for Starhome Mach said his company is "with immediate effect undertaking a full security audit to ensure that our infrastructure is secure" and that its platform had recently switched to a completely new configuration with mainly new hardware. Officials at Comfone said: "We have no knowledge of the British intelligence service infiltrating our systems." Syniverse also stated "there have been no known breaches of the Syniverse or MACH data centers by any government agency."

GCHQ did not comment on questions posed by SPIEGEL.

'Any Mobile Device, Anywhere, Anytime!'

For the British, all of this was apparently only an intermediate step on the path to a greater goal. In addition to the conventional Internet, GCHQ now wants to turn the mobile web into an all-seeing surveillance machine.

This is how the GCHQ spies described their "vision" in 2011: "Any mobile device, anywhere, anytime!"

In this context, the attacks on Belgacom and the clearinghouses merely serve as door openers. Once the telecommunications companies' actual mobile phone networks have been infiltrated, completely new monitoring possibilities present themselves to the spies. A briefing dating from 2011 stated the agency wanted to "increase operational capability to remotely deploy implants when we only know the MSISDN." In other words, GCHQ's phone hackers would ideally like to repurpose every mobile phone in the world into a bugging device, merely on the basis of the phone number. "That would be game changing," the document reads.

REPORTED BY LAURA POITRAS, MARCEL ROSENBACH, CHRISTOPH SCHEUERMANN, HOLGER STARK AND CHRISTIAN STÖCKER


Original article: By SPIEGEL Staff
Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 08:56:36 »

Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users' online anonymity

Secret servers and a privileged position on the internet's backbone used to identify users and attack target computers


Tor is a well-designed and robust anonymity tool, and successfully attacking it is difficult. Photograph: Magdalena Rehova/Alamy

The online anonymity network Tor is a high-priority target for the National Security Agency. The work of attacking Tor is done by the NSA's application vulnerabilities branch, which is part of the systems intelligence directorate, or SID. The majority of NSA employees work in SID, which is tasked with collecting data from communications systems around the world.

According to a top-secret NSA presentation provided by the whistleblower Edward Snowden, one successful technique the NSA has developed involves exploiting the Tor browser bundle, a collection of programs designed to make it easy for people to install and use the software. The trick identified Tor users on the internet and then executes an attack against their Firefox web browser.

The NSA refers to these capabilities as CNE, or computer network exploitation.

The first step of this process is finding Tor users. To accomplish this, the NSA relies on its vast capability to monitor large parts of the internet. This is done via the agency's partnership with US telecoms firms under programs codenamed Stormbrew, Fairview, Oakstar and Blarney.

The NSA creates "fingerprints" that detect http requests from the Tor network to particular servers. These fingerprints are loaded into NSA database systems like XKeyscore, a bespoke collection and analysis tool which NSA boasts allows its analysts to see "almost everything" a target does on the internet.

Using powerful data analysis tools with codenames such as Turbulence, Turmoil and Tumult, the NSA automatically sifts through the enormous amount of internet traffic that it sees, looking for Tor connections.

Last month, Brazilian TV news show Fantastico showed screenshots of an NSA tool that had the ability to identify Tor users by monitoring internet traffic.

The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from other web users. On the other hand, the anonymity provided by Tor makes it impossible for the NSA to know who the user is, or whether or not the user is in the US.

After identifying an individual Tor user on the internet, the NSA uses its network of secret internet servers to redirect those users to another set of secret internet servers, with the codename FoxAcid, to infect the user's computer. FoxAcid is an NSA system designed to act as a matchmaker between potential targets and attacks developed by the NSA, giving the agency opportunity to launch prepared attacks against their systems.

Once the computer is successfully attacked, it secretly calls back to a FoxAcid server, which then performs additional attacks on the target computer to ensure that it remains compromised long-term, and continues to provide eavesdropping information back to the NSA.

Exploiting the Tor browser bundle

Tor is a well-designed and robust anonymity tool, and successfully attacking it is difficult. The NSA attacks we found individually target Tor users by exploiting vulnerabilities in their Firefox browsers, and not the Tor application directly.

This, too, is difficult. Tor users often turn off vulnerable services like scripts and Flash when using Tor, making it difficult to target those services. Even so, the NSA uses a series of native Firefox vulnerabilities to attack users of the Tor browser bundle.

According to the training presentation provided by Snowden, EgotisticalGiraffe exploits a type confusion vulnerability in E4X, which is an XML extension for Javascript. This vulnerability exists in Firefox 11.0 – 16.0.2, as well as Firefox 10.0 ESR – the Firefox version used until recently in the Tor browser bundle. According to another document, the vulnerability exploited by EgotisticalGiraffe was inadvertently fixed when Mozilla removed the E4X library with the vulnerability, and when Tor added that Firefox version into the Tor browser bundle, but NSA were confident that they would be able to find a replacement Firefox exploit that worked against version 17.0 ESR.

The Quantum system

To trick targets into visiting a FoxAcid server, the NSA relies on its secret partnerships with US telecoms companies. As part of the Turmoil system, the NSA places secret servers, codenamed Quantum, at key places on the internet backbone. This placement ensures that they can react faster than other websites can. By exploiting that speed difference, these servers can impersonate a visited website to the target before the legitimate website can respond, thereby tricking the target's browser to visit a Foxacid server.

In the academic literature, these are called "man-in-the-middle" attacks, and have been known to the commercial and academic security communities. More specifically, they are examples of "man-on-the-side" attacks.

They are hard for any organization other than the NSA to reliably execute, because they require the attacker to have a privileged position on the internet backbone, and exploit a "race condition" between the NSA server and the legitimate website. This top-secret NSA diagram, made public last month, shows a Quantum server impersonating Google in this type of attack.

The NSA uses these fast Quantum servers to execute a packet injection attack, which surreptitiously redirects the target to the FoxAcid server. An article in the German magazine Spiegel, based on additional top secret Snowden documents, mentions an NSA developed attack technology with the name of QuantumInsert that performs redirection attacks. Another top-secret Tor presentation provided by Snowden mentions QuantumCookie to force cookies onto target browsers, and another Quantum program to "degrade/deny/disrupt Tor access".

This same technique is used by the Chinese government to block its citizens from reading censored internet content, and has been hypothesized as a probable NSA attack technique.

The FoxAcid system

According to various top-secret documents provided by Snowden, FoxAcid is the NSA codename for what the NSA calls an "exploit orchestrator," an internet-enabled system capable of attacking target computers in a variety of different ways. It is a Windows 2003 computer configured with custom software and a series of Perl scripts. These servers are run by the NSA's tailored access operations, or TAO, group. TAO is another subgroup of the systems intelligence directorate.

The servers are on the public internet. They have normal-looking domain names, and can be visited by any browser from anywhere; ownership of those domains cannot be traced back to the NSA.

However, if a browser tries to visit a FoxAcid server with a special URL, called a FoxAcid tag, the server attempts to infect that browser, and then the computer, in an effort to take control of it. The NSA can trick browsers into using that URL using a variety of methods, including the race-condition attack mentioned above and frame injection attacks.

FoxAcid tags are designed to look innocuous, so that anyone who sees them would not be suspicious. An example of one such tag [LINK REMOVED] is given in another top-secret training presentation provided by Snowden.

There is no currently registered domain name by that name; it is just an example for internal NSA training purposes.

The training material states that merely trying to visit the homepage of a real FoxAcid server will not result in any attack, and that a specialized URL is required. This URL would be created by TAO for a specific NSA operation, and unique to that operation and target. This allows the FoxAcid server to know exactly who the target is when his computer contacts it.

According to Snowden, FoxAcid is a general CNE system, used for many types of attacks other than the Tor attacks described here. It is designed to be modular, with flexibility that allows TAO to swap and replace exploits if they are discovered, and only run certain exploits against certain types of targets.

The most valuable exploits are saved for the most important targets. Low-value exploits are run against technically sophisticated targets where the chance of detection is high. TAO maintains a library of exploits, each based on a different vulnerability in a system. Different exploits are authorized against different targets, depending on the value of the target, the target's technical sophistication, the value of the exploit, and other considerations.

In the case of Tor users, FoxAcid might use EgotisticalGiraffe against their Firefox browsers.

According to a top-secret operational management procedures manual provided by Snowden, once a target is successfully exploited it is infected with one of several payloads. Two basic payloads mentioned in the manual, are designed to collect configuration and location information from the target computer so an analyst can determine how to further infect the computer.

These decisions are made in part by the technical sophistication of the target and the security software installed on the target computer; called Personal Security Products or PSP, in the manual.

FoxAcid payloads are updated regularly by TAO. For example, the manual refers to version 8.2.1.1 of one of them.

FoxAcid servers also have sophisticated capabilities to avoid detection and to ensure successful infection of its targets. The operations manual states that a FoxAcid payload with the codename DireScallop can circumvent commercial products that prevent malicious software from making changes to a system that survive a reboot process.

The NSA also uses phishing attacks to induce users to click on FoxAcid tags.

TAO additionally uses FoxAcid to exploit callbacks – which is the general term for a computer infected by some automatic means – calling back to the NSA for more instructions and possibly to upload data from the target computer.

According to a top-secret operational management procedures manual, FoxAcid servers configured to receive callbacks are codenamed FrugalShot. After a callback, the FoxAcid server may run more exploits to ensure that the target computer remains compromised long term, as well as install "implants" designed to exfiltrate data.

By 2008, the NSA was getting so much FoxAcid callback data that they needed to build a special system to manage it all.

 
Original article: Bruce Schneier theguardian.com, Friday 4 October 2013 15.50 BST

Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 08:44:29 »

NSA-document: SE status in the intelligence community

TOP

National Security 18 April 2013
Security Service

Information Paper


(SIIREL to USA, FVEY) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Sweden
(U) Introduction

TO USA, FVEY) NSA's relationship with the Swedish SIGINT service,
Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA), was established in 1954 under the UKUSA agreement.
At that time it was agreed that GCHQ would take the lead for the exchange of COMINT
information and that NSA would take the lead for the ELINT exchange. As of April
2004, NSA, GCHQ and the FRA agreed to dissolve this part of the UKUSA agreement
and hold bilateral exchanges on both COMINT and ELINT.

NSA's relationship with the FRA, an extremely competent, technically
innovative, and trusted Third Party partner, continues to grow. The FRA provided NSA
with access to its cable collection in 2011, providing unique collection on high-priority
Russian targets such as leadership, internal politics, and energy.

. FRA's efforts against counter-terrorism (CT) targets continue to expand, and
new legislation enacted in January 2013 has improved its ability to work directly with the
Swedish internal security service (SAPO). NSA's Data Acquisition is actively engaged
with the FRA, which has numerous collection sites and is proficient in collecting a wide
variety of communications.

(U) Key Issues

The FRA continues to place more emphasis on cyber. NSA's National
Threat Operations Center (NTOC) and FRA have an ongoing exchange
discussing malware topics. The FRA is positioning itself to become the cyber defense
authority in Sweden and hopes to receive the Swedish government mandate in the near
future.

Derived From: 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108
TOP


SE status in the intelligence community
Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 08:38:15 »

Germany and France warn NSA spying fallout jeopardises fight against terror

Angela Merkel and François Hollande lead push at EU summit to reshape transatlantic spying and agree new code of conduct

Germany and France are to spearhead a drive to try to force the Americans to agree new transatlantic rules on intelligence and security service behaviour in the wake of the Snowden revelations and allegations of mass US spying in France and tapping of the German chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone.

At an EU summit in Brussels that was hijacked by the furore over the activities of the National Security Agency in the US and Britain's GCHQ, the French president, François Hollande, also called for a new code of conduct agreed between national intelligence services in the EU, raising the question of whether Britain would opt to join in.

Shaken by this week's revelations of NSA operations in France and Germany, EU leaders and Merkel in particular warned that the international fight against terrorism was being jeopardised by the perception that mass US surveillance was out of control.

The leaders "stressed that intelligence-gathering is a vital element in the fight against terrorism", a summit statement said. "A lack of trust could prejudice the necessary co-operation in the field of intelligence-gathering."

Merkel drove the point home: "We need trust among allies and partners. Such trust now has to be built anew … The United States of America and Europe face common challenges. We are allies. But such an alliance can only be built on trust."

Privately, according to senior sources who witnessed the two-hour discussion of intelligence snooping on Thursday evening, Merkel told the other leaders that the issue at stake was not that her mobile phone may have been tapped by the Americans, but that it represented "the phones of millions of European citizens".

While conceding that intelligence services everywhere might be prone to behaving badly, Hollande dismissed suggestions that the Americans were merely operating as other security services also did. He complained that the revelations by the US whistleblower, Edward Snowden, showed a level of eavesdropping and data gathering that took place nowhere in Europe and was unique to the US agency.

A delegation of nine MEPs will travel to Washington on Monday for a three-day visit, during which they will press senior US government and intelligence officials for answers on allegations of widespread spying by the US, and explore "possible legal remedies for EU citizens" resulting from the alleged surveillance.

Separately, the German government said on Friday that a group of senior officials including the heads of its foreign and domestic intelligence agencies would travel to the US "shortly" for talks at the White House and with the NSA.

The White House spokesman Jay Carney said the Obama administration was discussing Germany's concerns "through diplomatic channels at the highest level".

It is plain that the French and the Germans want to limit the damage from the NSA furore, but also hope to engage the Americans to rein in their activities. They set a deadline of the end of the year for results. The statement said other countries could join the negotiations, leaving the door open for British participation.

Given the role of GCHQ in the mass surveillance, Cameron found himself the target of veiled criticism at the summit, according to witnesses. Merkel complained that Britain enjoyed a privileged position with the Americans because it is the only EU member in the "Five Eyes Club" – the intelligence-sharing arrangement linking the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Senior EU security officials suspect that Berlin may seek to exploit the crisis to gain admission to, or at least greater co-operation with, the Five Eyes pact.

Cameron, sources said, responded to the critical remarks by stressing that under his premiership the shared intelligence with the four other countries had resulted in several terrorist plots being foiled, with countless lives saved.

The controversy deepened on Thursday when the Guardian revealed that the NSA had monitored the phone conversations of 35 world leaders after being given their phone numbers by an official in another US government department. The latest claims, which emerged from a classified document provided by Snowden, have further overshadowed this week's EU summit in Brussels.

Despite US efforts to placate Merkel – including a phone call with the US president, Barack Obama, on Wednesday – she has refused to conceal her anger.

Merkel briefed the other leaders in some detail on the 20-minute conversation with Obama, sources said, adding that several participants commented that they thought the US leader was "embarrassed".

The European anger and frustration was directed at a US agency seen to be out of control and beyond appropriate scrutiny rather than being aimed at Obama.

The latest confidential memo provided by Snowden reveals that the NSA encourages senior officials in its "customer" departments – such as the White House, state department and the Pentagon – to share their Rolodexes so that the agency can add the phone numbers of leading foreign politicians to their surveillance systems.

The document notes that one unnamed US official handed over 200 numbers, including those of the 35 world leaders, none of whom has been named. These were immediately "tasked" for monitoring by the NSA.


Original article: Ian Traynor in Brussels theguardian.com, Friday 25 October 2013 12.31 BST
Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 08:34:51 »

Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin



According to SPIEGEL research, United States intelligence agencies have not only targeted Chancellor Angela Merkel's cellphone, but they have also used the American Embassy in Berlin as a listening station. The revelations now pose a serious threat to German-American relations.

It's a prime site, a diplomat's dream. Is there any better location for an embassy than Berlin's Pariser Platz? It's just a few paces from here to the Reichstag. When the American ambassador steps out the door, he looks directly onto the Brandenburg Gate.
 
 When the United States moved into the massive embassy building in 2008, it threw a huge party. Over 4,500 guests were invited. Former President George H. W. Bush cut the red-white-and-blue ribbon. Chancellor Angela Merkel offered warm words for the occasion. Since then, when the US ambassador receives high-ranking visitors, they often take a stroll out to the roof terrace, which offers a breathtaking view of the Reichstag and Tiergarten park. Even the Chancellery can be glimpsed. This is the political heart of the republic, where billion-euro budgets are negotiated, laws are formulated and soldiers are sent to war. It's an ideal location for diplomats -- and for spies.
 
Research by SPIEGEL reporters in Berlin and Washington, talks with intelligence officials and the evaluation of internal documents of the US' National Security Agency and other information, most of which comes from the archive of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, lead to the conclusion that the US diplomatic mission in the German capital has not merely been promoting German-American friendship. On the contrary, it is a nest of espionage. From the roof of the embassy, a special unit of the CIA and NSA can apparently monitor a large part of cellphone communication in the government quarter. And there is evidence that agents based at Pariser Platz recently targeted the cellphone that Merkel uses the most.

The NSA spying scandal has thus reached a new level, becoming a serious threat to the trans-Atlantic partnership. The mere suspicion that one of Merkel's cellphones was being monitored by the NSA has led in the past week to serious tensions between Berlin and Washington.

Hardly anything is as sensitive a subject to Merkel as the surveillance of her cellphone. It is her instrument of power. She uses it not only to lead her party, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), but also to conduct a large portion of government business. Merkel uses the device so frequently that there was even debate earlier this year over whether her text-messaging activity should be archived as part of executive action.

'That's Just Not Done'

Merkel has often said -- half in earnest, half in jest -- that she operates under the assumption that her phone calls are being monitored. But she apparently had in mind countries like China and Russia, where data protection is not taken very seriously, and not Germany's friends in Washington.

Last Wednesday Merkel placed a strongly worded phone call to US President Barack Obama. Sixty-two percent of Germans approve of her harsh reaction, according to a survey by polling institute YouGov. A quarter think it was too mild. In a gesture of displeasure usually reserved for rogue states, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle summoned the new US ambassador, John Emerson, for a meeting at the Foreign Ministry.

The NSA affair has shaken the certainties of German politics. Even Merkel's CDU, long a loyal friend of Washington, is now openly questioning the trans-Atlantic free trade agreement. At the Chancellery it's now being said that if the US government doesn't take greater pains to clarify the situation, certain conclusions will be drawn and talks over the agreement could potentially be put on hold.

"Spying between friends, that's just not done," said Merkel on Thursday at a European Union summit in Brussels. "Now trust has to be rebuilt." But until recently it sounded as if the government had faith in its ally's intelligence agencies.

In mid-August Merkel's chief of staff, Ronald Pofalla, offhandedly described the NSA scandal as over. German authorities offered none of their own findings -- just a dry statement from the NSA leadership saying the agency adhered to all agreements between the countries.

Now it is not just Pofalla who stands disgraced, but Merkel as well. She looks like a head of government who only stands up to Obama when she herself is a target of the US intelligence services. The German website Der Postillon published a satirical version last Thursday of the statement given by Merkel's spokesman, Steffen Seibert: "The chancellor considers it a slap in the face that she has most likely been monitored over the years just like some mangy resident of Germany."

Merkel has nothing to fear domestically from the recent turn of affairs. The election is over, the conservatives and the center-left Social Democrats are already in official negotiations toward forming a new government. No one wants to poison the atmosphere with mutual accusation.

Nevertheless, Merkel must now answer the question of how much she is willing to tolerate from her American allies.

Posing as Diplomats

A "top secret" classified NSA document from the year 2010 shows that a unit known as the "Special Collection Service" (SCS) is operational in Berlin, among other locations. It is an elite corps run in concert by the US intelligence agencies NSA and CIA.

The secret list reveals that its agents are active worldwide in around 80 locations, 19 of which are in Europe -- cities such as Paris, Madrid, Rome, Prague and Geneva. The SCS maintains two bases in Germany, one in Berlin and another in Frankfurt. That alone is unusual. But in addition, both German bases are equipped at the highest level and staffed with active personnel.

The SCS teams predominantly work undercover in shielded areas of the American Embassy and Consulate, where they are officially accredited as diplomats and as such enjoy special privileges. Under diplomatic protection, they are able to look and listen unhindered. They just can't get caught.

Wiretapping from an embassy is illegal in nearly every country. But that is precisely the task of the SCS, as is evidenced by another secret document. According to the document, the SCS operates its own sophisticated listening devices with which they can intercept virtually every popular method of communication: cellular signals, wireless networks and satellite communication.

The necessary equipment is usually installed on the upper floors of the embassy buildings or on rooftops where the technology is covered with screens or Potemkin-like structures that protect it from prying eyes.

That is apparently the case in Berlin, as well. SPIEGEL asked British investigative journalist Duncan Campbell to appraise the setup at the embassy. In 1976, Campbell uncovered the existence of the British intelligence service GCHQ. In his so-called "Echelon Report" in 1999, he described for the European Parliament the existence of the global surveillance network of the same name.

Campbell refers to window-like indentations on the roof of the US Embassy. They are not glazed but rather veneered with "dielectric" material and are painted to blend into the surrounding masonry. This material is permeable even by weak radio signals. The interception technology is located behind these radio-transparent screens, says Campbell. The offices of SCS agents would most likely be located in the same windowless attic.

No Comment from the NSA

This would correspond to internal NSA documents seen by SPIEGEL. They show, for example, an SCS office in another US embassy -- a small windowless room full of cables with a work station of "signal processing racks" containing dozens of plug-in units for "signal analysis."

On Friday, author and NSA expert James Bamford also visited SPIEGEL's Berlin bureau, which is located on Pariser Platz diagonally opposite the US Embassy. "To me, it looks like NSA eavesdropping equipment is hidden behind there," he said. "The covering seems to be made of the same material that the agency uses to shield larger systems."

The Berlin-based security expert Andy Müller Maguhn was also consulted. "The location is ideal for intercepting mobile communications in Berlin's government district," he says, "be it technical surveillance of communication between cellphones and wireless cell towers or radio links that connect radio towers to the network."

Apparently, SCS agents use the same technology all over the world. They can intercept cellphone signals while simultaneously locating people of interest. One antenna system used by the SCS is known by the affable code name "Einstein."

When contacted by SPIEGEL, the NSA declined to comment on the matter.
 
 The SCS are careful to hide their technology, especially the large antennas on the roofs of embassies and consulates. If the equipment is discovered, explains a "top secret" set of classified internal guidelines, it "would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government."

According to the documents, SCS units can also intercept microwave and millimeter-wave signals. Some programs, such as one entitled "Birdwatcher," deal primarily with encrypted communications in foreign countries and the search for potential access points. Birdwatcher is controlled directly from SCS headquarters in Maryland.

With the growing importance of the Internet, the work of the SCS has changed. Some 80 branches offer "thousands of opportunities on the net" for web-based operations, according to an internal presentation. The organization is now able not only to intercept cellphone calls and satellite communication, but also to proceed against criminals or hackers. From some embassies, the Americans have planted sensors in communications equipment of the respective host countries that are triggered by selected terms.


Original article: By SPIEGEL Staff



Part 2: How the Scandal Began

There are strong indications that it was the SCS that targeted Chancellor Angela Merkel's cellphone. This is suggested by a document that apparently comes from an NSA database in which the agency records its targets. This document, which SPIEGEL has seen, is what set the cellphone scandal in motion.

The document contains Merkel's cellphone number. An inquiry to her team revealed that it is the number the chancellor uses mainly to communicate with party members, ministers and confidants, often by text message. The number is, in the language of the NSA, a "Selector Value." The next two fields determine the format ("raw phone number") and the "Subscriber," identified as "GE Chancellor Merkel."

In the next field, labeled "Ropi," the NSA defines who is interested in the German chancellor: It is the department S2C32. "S" stands for "Signals Intelligence Directorate," the NSA umbrella term for signal reconnaissance. "2" is the agency's department for procurement and evaluation. C32 is the unit responsible for Europe, the "European States Branch." So the order apparently came down from Europe specialists in charge of signal reconnaissance.

The time stamp is noteworthy. The order was transferred to the "National Sigint Requirements List," the list of national intelligence targets, in 2002. That was the year Germany held closely watched parliamentary elections and Merkel battled Edmund Stoiber of Bavaria's Christian Social Union to become the conservatives' chancellor candidate. It was also the year the Iraq crisis began heating up. The document also lists status: "A" for active. This status was apparently valid a few weeks before President Obama's Berlin visit in June 2013.

Finally, the document defines the units tasked with implementing the order: the "Target Office of Primary Interest": "F666E." "F6" is the NSA's internal name for the global surveillance unit, the "Special Collection Service."

Thus, the NSA would have targeted Merkel's cellphone for more than a decade, first when she was just party chair, as well as later when she'd become chancellor. The record does not indicate what form of surveillance has taken place. Were all of her conversations recorded or just connection data? Were her movements also being recorded?

'Intelligence Target Number One'

Among the politically decisive questions is whether the spying was authorized from the top: from the US president. If the data is accurate, the operation was authorized under former President George W. Bush and his NSA chief, Michael Hayden. But it would have had to be repeatedly approved, including after Obama took office and up to the present time. Is it conceivable that the NSA made the German chancellor a surveillance target without the president's knowledge?

The White House and the US intelligence agencies periodically put together a list of priorities. Listed by country and theme, the result is a matrix of global surveillance: What are the intelligence targets in various countries? How important is this reconnaissance? The list is called the "National Intelligence Priorities Framework" and is "presidentially approved."

One category in this list is "Leadership Intentions," the goals and objectives of a country's political leadership. The intentions of China's leadership are of high interest to the US government. They are marked with a "1" on a scale of 1 to 5. Mexico and Brazil each receive a "3" in this category.

Germany appears on this list as well. The US intelligence agencies are mainly interested in the country's economic stability and foreign policy objectives (both "3"), as well as in its advanced weapons systems and a few other sub-items, all of which are marked "4." The "Leadership Intention" field is empty. So based on the list, it wouldn't appear that Merkel should be monitored.

Former NSA employee Thomas Drake does not see this as a contradiction. "After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Germany became intelligence target number one in Europe," he says. The US government did not trust Germany, because some of the Sept. 11 suicide pilots had lived in Hamburg. Evidence suggests that the NSA recorded Merkel once and then became intoxicated with success, says Drake. "It has always been the NSA's motto to conduct as much surveillance as possible," he adds.

A Political Bomb

When SPIEGEL confronted the government on Oct. 10 with evidence that the chancellor's cellphone had been targeted, the German security apparatus became deeply unsettled.

The Chancellery ordered the country's foreign intelligence agency, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), to scrutinize the information. In parallel, Christoph Heusgen, Merkel's foreign policy adviser, also contacted his US counterpart, National Security Adviser Susan Rice, to tell her about SPIEGEL's research, which had been summarized on a single sheet of paper. Rice said she would look into it.

Shortly afterwards, German security authorities got back to the Chancellery with a preliminary result: The numbers, dates and secret codes on the paper indicated the information was accurate. It was probably some kind of form from an intelligence agency department requesting surveillance on the chancellor's cellphone, they said. At this point, a sense of nervousness began to grow at government headquarters. It was clear to everyone that if the Americans were monitoring Merkel's phone, it would be a political bomb.

But then Rice called the Chancellery on Friday evening to explain that if reports began to circulate that Merkel's phone had been targeted, Washington would deny it -- or at least that is how the Germans understood the message. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney assured his counterpart, Merkel's spokesperson Steffen Seibert, of the same thing. The message was passed on to SPIEGEL late that evening without comment, at which point editors decided to continue investigating.

With this, both the US agencies and Berlin won themselves more time to come up with a battle plan for approaching the deep crisis of confidence between the two countries. And it was clearly already a crisis of confidence, because Berlin obviously doubted the statements coming from the US and hadn't called off its probe. And, as later became clear, there were also inquiries taking place in the US, despite the denial from Rice.

Over the weekend, the tide turned.

Rice contacted Heusgen once again, but this time her voice sounded less certain. She said that the possibility the chancellor's phone was under surveillance could only be ruled out currently and in the future. Heusgen asked for more details, but was put off. The chief adviser to the president on Europe, Karen Donfried, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia at the US State Department, Victoria Nuland, would provide further information midweek, he was told. By this time it was clear to the Chancellery that if Obama's top security adviser no longer felt comfortable ruling out possible surveillance, this amounted to confirmation of their suspicions.

Going on the Offensive

This detail only served to intensify the catastrophe. Not only had supposed friends monitored the chancellor's cellphone, which was bad enough on its own, but leaders in Berlin were also left looking like a group of amateurs. They had believed the assurances made this summer by Obama, who downplayed the notion of spying in Germany on a visit to Berlin. German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich had even gone so far as to say at the time that Germany's concerns had "dissipated."

On Tuesday morning Merkel decided to go on the offensive. She had seen how strongly French President François Hollande had reacted to allegations that US intelligence agencies had conducted widespread surveillance on French citizens. Hollande called Obama immediately to air his anger. Merkel now wanted to speak with Obama personally too -- before her planned meeting with Hollande at the upcoming EU summit in Brussels.

Heusgen made a preliminary call to Obama to let him know that Merkel planned to make some serious complaints, with which she would then go public. At stake was control over the political interpretation of one of the year's most explosive news stories.

Merkel spoke with Obama on Wednesday afternoon, calling him from her secure landline in her Chancellery office. Both spoke English. According to the Chancellery, the president said that he had known nothing of possible monitoring, otherwise he would have stopped it. Obama also expressed his deepest regrets and apologized.

Around 5:30 p.m. the same day, Merkel's chief of staff, Pofalla, informed two members of the Parliamentary Control Panel, the body in Germany's parliament charged with keeping tabs on the country's intelligence agencies, of what was going on. At the same time, the administration went public with the matter. It contacted SPIEGEL first with a statement containing Merkel's criticism of possible spying on her cellphone. Her spokesman Seibert called it a "grave breach of trust" -- a choice of phrase seen as the highest level of verbal escalation among allied diplomats.


Original article: By SPIEGEL Staff



Part 3: Surprising Unscrupulousness

The scandal revives an old question: Are the German security agencies too trusting of the Americans? Until now, German agencies have typically concerned themselves with China and Russia in their counterintelligence work, for which the domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV), is responsible.

A year ago, there was already debate between the agencies, the Interior Ministry and the Chancellery over whether Germany should be taking a harder look at what American agents were up to in the country. But the idea was jettisoned because it seemed too politically sensitive. The main question at the time came down to whether monitoring allies should be allowed.

Even to seasoned German intelligence officials, the revelations that have come to light present a picture of surprising unscrupulousness. It's quite possible that the BFV could soon be tasked with investigating the activities of the CIA and NSA.

The ongoing spying scandal is also fueling allegations that the Germans have been allowing the NSA to lead them around by the nose. From the beginning of the NSA scandal, Berlin has conducted its attempts to clarify the allegations with a mixture of naivety and ignorance.

Letters with anxious questions were sent, and a group of government department leaders traveled to Washington to meet with Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. The BND was also commissioned with negotiating a "no-spying pact" with the US agencies. In this way, Merkel's government feigned activity while remaining largely in the dark. In fact, it relied primarily on the assurance from the US that its intentions were good.

It also seems to be difficult for German intelligence agencies to actually track the activities of the NSA. High-level government officials admit the Americans' technical capabilities are in many ways superior to what exists in Germany. At the BFV domestic intelligence agency, for example, not even every employee has a computer with an Internet connection.

But now, as a consequence of the spying scandal, the German agencies want to beef up their capabilities. "We're talking about a fundamental realignment of counterintelligence," said one senior security official. There are already more than 100 employees at the BFV responsible for counterintelligence, but officials are hoping to see this double.

One focus of strategic considerations is the embassy buildings in central Berlin. "We don't know which roofs currently have spying equipment installed," says the security official. "That is a problem."

Trade Agreement at Risk?

When the news of Merkel's mobile phone being tapped began making the rounds, the BND and the BSI, the federal agency responsible for information security, took over investigation of the matter. There too, officials have been able to do nothing more than ask questions of the Americans when such sensitive issues have come up in recent months.

But now German-American relations are threatened with an ice age. Merkel's connection to Obama wasn't particularly good before the spying scandal. The chancellor is said to consider the president overrated -- a politician who talks a lot but does little, and is unreliable to boot.

One example, from Berlin's perspective, was the military operation in Libya almost three years ago, which Obama initially rejected. When then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton convinced him to change his mind, he did so without consulting his allies. Berlin saw this as evidence of his fickleness and disregard for their concerns.

The chancellor also finds Washington's regular advice on how to solve the euro crisis irritating. She would prefer not to receive instruction from the country that caused the collapse of the global financial system in the first place. Meanwhile, the Americans have been annoyed for years that Germany isn't willing to do more to boost the world economy.

Merkel also feels as though she was duped. The Chancellery now plans once again to review the assurances of US intelligence agencies to make sure they are abiding by the law.

The chancellor's office is also now considering the possibility that the much-desired trans-Atlantic free trade agreement could fail if the NSA affair isn't properly cleared up. Since the latest revelations came out, some 58 percent of Germans say they support breaking off ongoing talks, while just 28 percent are against it. "We should put the negotiations for a free-trade agreement with the US on ice until the accusations against the NSA have been clarified," says Bavarian Economy Minister Ilse Aigner, a member of the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party to Merkel's Christian Democrats.

Outgoing Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger has used the scandal as an excuse to appeal to the conscience of her counterpart in Washington, Attorney General Eric Holder. "The citizens rightly expect that American institutions also adhere to German laws. Unfortunately, there are a number of indications to the contrary," she wrote in a letter to Holder last week.

EU Leaders Consider Consequences

The American spying tactics weren't far from the minds of leaders at the EU summit in Brussels last Thursday, either. French President Hollande was the first to bring it up at dinner, saying that while he didn't want to demonize the intelligence agencies, the Americans had so blatantly broken the law on millions of counts that he couldn't imagine how things could go on this way.

Hollande called for a code of conduct among the intelligence agencies, an idea for which Merkel also showed support. But soon doubts emerged: Wouldn't Europe also have to take a look at its own surveillance practices? What if a German or French Snowden came forward to reveal dirty spy tactics? British Prime Minister David Cameron pointed out how many terror attacks had been prevented because of spying capabilities. Then it was asked whether it has been proven that Obama even knows what his agencies are doing. Suddenly, mutual understanding seemed to waft through the group.

That was a bit too rich for Hollande: No, he interjected, spying to such an immense degree, allegedly on more than 70 million phone calls per month in France alone -- that has been undertaken by only one country: the United States. The interruption was effective. After nearly three hours, the EU member states agreed on a statement that can be read as clear disapproval of the Americans.

Merkel no longer wants to rely solely on promises. This week Günter Heiss, Chancellor Merkel's intelligence coordinator, will travel to Washington. Heiss wants the Americans finally to promise a contract excluding mutual surveillance. The German side already announced its intention to sign on to this no-spying pact during the summer, but the US government has so far shown little inclination to seriously engage with the topic.

This is, of course, also about the chancellor's cellphone. Because despite all the anger, Merkel still didn't want to give up using her old number as of the end of last week. She was using it to make calls and to send text messages. Only for very delicate conversations did she switch to a secure line.

BY JACOB APPELBAUM, NIKOLAUS BLOME, HUBERT GUDE, RALF NEUKIRCH, RENÉ PFISTER, LAURA POITRAS, MARCEL ROSENBACH, JÖRG SCHINDLER, GREGOR PETER SCHMITZ AND HOLGER STARK


Original article: By SPIEGEL Staff
Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 08:21:57 »

NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official handed over contacts


The NSA memo suggests that such surveillance was not isolated as the agency routinely monitors world leaders. Photograph: Guardian

The National Security Agency monitored the phone conversations of 35 world leaders after being given the numbers by an official in another US government department, according to a classified document provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden.

The confidential memo reveals that the NSA encourages senior officials in its "customer" departments, such as the White House, State and the Pentagon, to share their "Rolodexes" so the agency can add the phone numbers of leading foreign politicians to their surveillance systems.

The document notes that one unnamed US official handed over 200 numbers, including those of the 35 world leaders, none of whom is named. These were immediately "tasked" for monitoring by the NSA.

The revelation is set to add to mounting diplomatic tensions between the US and its allies, after the German chancellor Angela Merkel on Wednesday accused the US of tapping her mobile phone.

After Merkel's allegations became public, White House press secretary Jay Carney issued a statement that said the US "is not monitoring and will not monitor" the German chancellor's communications. But that failed to quell the row, as officials in Berlin quickly pointed out that the US did not deny monitoring the phone in the past.

Arriving in Brussels for an EU summit Merkel accused the US of a breach of trust. "We need to have trust in our allies and partners, and this must now be established once again. I repeat that spying among friends is not at all acceptable against anyone, and that goes for every citizen in Germany."

The NSA memo obtained by the Guardian suggests that such surveillance was not isolated, as the agency routinely monitors the phone numbers of world leaders – and even asks for the assistance of other US officials to do so.

The memo, dated October 2006 and which was issued to staff in the agency's Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), was titled "Customers Can Help SID Obtain Targetable Phone Numbers".

It begins by setting out an example of how US officials who mixed with world leaders and politicians could help agency surveillance.

"In one recent case," the memo notes, "a US official provided NSA with 200 phone numbers to 35 world leaders … Despite the fact that the majority is probably available via open source, the PCs [intelligence production centers] have noted 43 previously unknown phone numbers. These numbers plus several others have been tasked."

The document continues by saying the new phone numbers had helped the agency discover still more new contact details to add to their monitoring: "These numbers have provided lead information to other numbers that have subsequently been tasked."

But the memo acknowledges that eavesdropping on the numbers had produced "little reportable intelligence". In the wake of the Merkel row, the US is facing growing international criticism that any intelligence benefit from spying on friendly governments is far outweighed by the potential diplomatic damage.

The memo then asks analysts to think about any customers they currently serve who might similarly be happy to turn over details of their contacts.

"This success leads S2 [signals intelligence] to wonder if there are NSA liaisons whose supported customers may be willing to share their 'Rolodexes' or phone lists with NSA as potential sources of intelligence," it states. "S2 welcomes such information!"

The document suggests that sometimes these offers come unsolicited, with US "customers" spontaneously offering the agency access to their overseas networks.

"From time to time, SID is offered access to the personal contact databases of US officials," it states. "Such 'Rolodexes' may contain contact information for foreign political or military leaders, to include direct line, fax, residence and cellular numbers."

The Guardian approached the Obama administration for comment on the latest document. Officials declined to respond directly to the new material, instead referring to comments delivered by Carney at Thursday's daily briefing.

Carney told reporters: "The [NSA] revelations have clearly caused tension in our relationships with some countries, and we are dealing with that through diplomatic channels.

"These are very important relations both economically and for our security, and we will work to maintain the closest possible ties."

The public accusation of spying on Merkel adds to mounting political tensions in Europe about the scope of US surveillance on the governments of its allies, after a cascade of backlashes and apologetic phone calls with leaders across the continent over the course of the week.

Asked on Wednesday evening if the NSA had in the past tracked the German chancellor's communications, Caitlin Hayden, the White House's National Security Council spokeswoman, said: "The United States is not monitoring and will not monitor the communications of Chancellor Merkel. Beyond that, I'm not in a position to comment publicly on every specific alleged intelligence activity."

At the daily briefing on Thursday, Carney again refused to answer repeated questions about whether the US had spied on Merkel's calls in the past.

The NSA memo seen by the Guardian was written halfway through George W Bush's second term, when Condoleezza Rice was secretary of state and Donald Rumsfeld was in his final months as defence secretary.

Merkel, who, according to Reuters, suspected the surveillance after finding her mobile phone number written on a US document, is said to have called for US surveillance to be placed on a new legal footing during a phone call to President Obama.

"The [German] federal government, as a close ally and partner of the US, expects in the future a clear contractual basis for the activity of the services and their co-operation," she told the president.

The leader of Germany's Green party, Katrin Goring-Eckhart, called the alleged spying an "unprecedented breach of trust" between the two countries.

Earlier in the week, Obama called the French president François Hollande in response to reports in Le Monde that the NSA accessed more than 70m phone records of French citizens in a single 30-day period, while earlier reports in Der Spiegel uncovered NSA activity against the offices and communications of senior officials of the European Union.

The European Commission, the executive body of the EU, this week backed proposals that could require US tech companies to seek permission before handing over EU citizens' data to US intelligence agencies, while the European parliament voted in favour of suspending a transatlantic bank data sharing agreement after Der Spiegel revealed the agency was monitoring the international bank transfer system Swift.


Original article: The Guardian, Friday 25 October 2013
Posted by: Pez
« on: 14. December 2013., 08:16:10 »

Codename 'Apalachee': How America Spies on Europe and the UN

President Obama promised that NSA surveillance activities were aimed exclusively at preventing terrorist attacks. But secret documents from the intelligence agency show that the Americans spy on Europe, the UN and other countries.

The European Union building on New York's Third Avenue is an office tower with a glittering facade and an impressive view of the East River. Chris Matthews, the press officer for the EU delegation to the United Nations, opens the ambassadors' room on the 31st floor, gestures toward a long conference table and says: "This is where all ambassadors from our 28 members meet every Tuesday at 9 a.m." It is the place where Europe seeks to forge a common policy on the UN.
 
 To mark the official opening of the delegation's new offices in September 2012, EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso and EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy flew in from Brussels, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was on hand as guest of honor. For "old" Europe -- which finances over one-third of the regular UN budget -- this was a confirmation of its geopolitical importance.
 
For the National Security Agency (NSA), America's powerful intelligence organization, the move was above all a technical challenge. A new office means freshly painted walls, untouched wiring and newly installed computer networks -- in other words, loads of work for the agents. While the Europeans were still getting used to their glittering new offices, NSA staff had already acquired the building's floor plans. The drawings completed by New York real estate company Tishman Speyer show precisely to scale how the offices are laid out. Intelligence agents made enlarged copies of the areas where the data servers are located. At the NSA, the European mission near the East River is referred to by the codename "Apalachee".

The floor plans are part of the NSA's internal documents relating to its operations targeting the EU. They come from whistleblower Edward Snowden, and SPIEGEL has been able to view them. For the NSA, they formed the basis for an intelligence-gathering operation -- but for US President Barack Obama they have now become a political problem.

Just over two weeks ago, Obama made a promise to the world. "The main thing I want to emphasize is that I don't have an interest and the people at the NSA don't have an interest in doing anything other than making sure that (...) we can prevent a terrorist attack," Obama said during a hastily arranged press conference at the White House on August 9. He said the sole purpose of the program was to "get information ahead of time (...) so we are able to carry out that critical task," adding: "We do not have an interest in doing anything other than that." Afterward, the president flew to the Atlantic island of Martha's Vineyard for his summer vacation.

Wide Range of New Surveillance Programs

Obama's appearance before the press was an attempt to morally justify the work of the intelligence agencies; to declare it as a type of emergency defense. His message was clear: Intelligence is only gathered because there is terror -- and anything that saves people's lives can't be bad. Ever since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, this logic has been the basis for a wide range of new surveillance programs.

With his statement delivered in the White House briefing room, Obama hoped to take the pressure off, primarily on the domestic political front. In Washington the president is currently facing opposition from an unusual alliance of left-wing Democrats and libertarian conservatives. They are supported by veteran politicians like Republican Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, one of the architects of the Patriot Act, which was used to massively expand surveillance in the wake of 9/11. On July 24, a bill that would have curtailed the power of the NSA was only narrowly defeated by 217 to 205 votes in the House of Representatives.

Even stalwart Obama supporters like Democrat Nancy Pelosi, minority leader in the House of Representatives, are now calling into question the work of the intelligence agency. Pelosi says that what she reads in the newspapers is "disturbing." It wasn't until late last week that news broke that the NSA had illegally collected tens of thousands of emails over a number of years.

Obama's public appearance was aimed at reassuring his critics. At the same time, he made a commitment. He gave assurances that the NSA is a clean agency that isn't involved in any dirty work. Obama has given his word on this matter. The only problem is that, if internal NSA documents are to be believed, it isn't true.

The classified documents, which SPIEGEL has seen, demonstrate how systematically the Americans target other countries and institutions like the EU, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna and the UN. They show how the NSA infiltrated the Europeans' internal computer network between New York and Washington, used US embassies abroad to intercept communications and eavesdropped on video conferences of UN diplomats. The surveillance is intensive and well-organized -- and it has little or nothing to do with counter-terrorism.

Targeting Foreign Governments

In an internal presentation, the NSA sums up its vision, which is both global and frighteningly ambitious: "information superiority." To achieve this worldwide dominance, the intelligence agency has launched diverse programs with names like "Dancingoasis," "Oakstar" and "Prism." Some of them aim to prevent terrorist attacks, while others target things like arms deliveries, drug trafficking and organized crime. But there are other programs, like "Blarney" and "Rampart-T," that serve a different purpose: that of traditional espionage targeting foreign governments.

Blarney has existed since the 1970s and it falls under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, at least according to the NSA documents, which state that it is based on the cooperation of at least one US telecommunications company that provides services to the agency. The NSA describes the program's main targets as "diplomatic establishment, counter-terrorism, foreign government and economic." These documents also say that Blarney is one of the "top sources" for the President's Daily Brief, a top-secret document which briefs the US president every morning on intelligence matters. Some 11,000 pieces of information reportedly come from Blarney every year.

No less explosive is the program dubbed "Rampart-T" by the NSA and which, by the agency's own accounts, has been running since 1991. It has to do with "penetration of hard targets at or near the leadership level" -- in other words: heads of state and their closest aides.

This information is intended for "the president and his national security advisors." Rampart-T is directed against some 20 countries, including China and Russia, but also Eastern European states.

The Americans recently drew up a secret chart that maps out what aspects of which countries require intelligence. The 12-page overview, created in April, has a scale of priorities ranging from red "1" (highest degree of interest) to blue "5" (low interest). Countries like Iran, North Korea, China and Russia are colored primarily red, meaning that additional information is required on virtually all fronts.

But the UN and the EU are also listed as espionage targets, with issues of economic stability as the primary concern. The focus, though, is also on trade policy and foreign policy (each rated "3") as well as energy security, food products and technological innovations (each rated "5").

Bugging the EU

The espionage attack on the EU is not only a surprise for most European diplomats, who until now assumed that they maintained friendly ties to the US government. It is also remarkable because the NSA has rolled out the full repertoire of intelligence-gathering tools -- and has apparently been taking this approach for many years now. According to an operational overview from September 2010 that is rated "secret," not only have the Americans infiltrated the EU mission to the UN in New York, but also the EU embassy in Washington, giving the building in the heart of the American capital the code name "Magothy."

According to this secret document, the NSA has targeted the European missions in three ways:

◾The embassies in Washington and New York are bugged.

◾At the embassy in New York, the hard disks have also been copied.

◾In Washington the agents have also tapped into the internal computer cable network.

 
 The infiltration of both EU embassies gave the technicians from Fort Meade an invaluable advantage: It guaranteed the Americans continuous access, even if they temporarily lost contact with one of the systems -- due, for instance, to a technical update or because an EU administrator thought that he had discovered a virus.
 
The embassies are linked via a so-called virtual private network (VPN). "If we lose access to one site, we can immediately regain it by riding the VPN to the other side and punching a whole (sic!) out," the NSA technicians said during an internal presentation. "We have done this several times when we got locked out of Magothy."

Of particular note, the data systems of the EU embassies in America are maintained by technicians in Brussels; Washington and New York are connected to the larger EU network. Whether the NSA has been able to penetrate as far as Brussels remains unclear. What is certain, though, is that they had a great deal of inside knowledge from Brussels, as demonstrated by a classified report from the year 2005 concerning a visit by top American diplomat Clayland Boyden Gray at Fort Meade.


Original article: In Spegel online By Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark



Part 2: 'Best Friends' at the NSA


Gray was on his way to Brussels as the new US ambassador to the EU. Before he left the country, he was invited by the corresponding NSA department to Fort Meade, where he was allowed to peek inside their treasure chest. The ambassador was "apprised of NSA's capabilities and limitations in collecting communications in Europe," the documents note.

Gray was presented with a selection of intercepted and bugged reports relating to diplomacy, business and foreign trade along with information on his future contacts at the EU. "I had no idea I would receive such detailed information," the ambassador said afterwards in amazement, according to NSA documents. That was "fabulous," he told them, adding: "You people at the NSA are becoming my new best friends."

Beyond their infiltration of the EU, the Americans are also highly interested in intelligence on the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. The IAEA has been given a red "1" in the area of arms control, while the focus at the UN is on foreign policy ("2") along with human rights, war crimes, environment issues and raw materials (each "3").

The NSA has its own team stationed at the UN, with each of the specialists disguised as diplomats. A secret crew from Washington regularly comes to town to bolster the team's ranks before each session of the General Assembly.

But the Americans also eavesdrop wherever possible during the day-to-day -- and they have been particularly successful at it for quite some time, as the corresponding department proudly reported in June 2012. In a status report they wrote that they had gained "a new access to internal United Nations communication."

Spies Spying on the Spies

Furthermore, NSA technicians working for the Blarney program have managed to decrypt the UN's internal video teleconferencing (VTC) system. The combination of this new access to the UN and the cracked encryption code have led to "a dramatic improvement in VTC data quality and (the) ability to decrypt the VTC traffic," the NSA agents noted with great satisfaction: "This traffic is getting us internal UN VTCs (yay!)." Within just under three weeks, the number of decrypted communications increased from 12 to 458.

Occasionally this espionage verges on the absurd in a manner that would fit in perfectly with a John le Carré novel. According to an internal report, the NSA caught the Chinese spying on the UN in 2011. The NSA managed to penetrate their adversary's defenses and "tap into Chinese SIGINT (signals intelligence) collection," as it says in a document that describes how spies were spying on spies. Based on this source, the NSA has allegedly gained access to three reports on "high interest, high profile current events."

The internal NSA documents correspond to instructions from the State Department, which then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed off on in July 2009. With the 29-page report called "Reporting and Collection Needs: The United Nations," the State Department called on its diplomats to collect information on key players of the UN.

According to this document, the diplomats were asked to gather numbers for phones, mobiles, pagers and fax machines. They were called on to amass phone and email directories, credit card and frequent-flier customer numbers, duty rosters, passwords and even biometric data.

When SPIEGEL reported on the confidential cable back in 2010, the State Department tried to deflect the criticism by saying that it was merely helping out other agencies. In reality, though, as the NSA documents now clearly show, they served as the basis for various clandestine operations targeting the UN and other countries.

Experts on the UN have long suspected that the organization has become a hotbed of activity for various intelligence agencies. After leaving Prime Minister Tony Blair's cabinet, former British Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short admitted that in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003 she had seen transcripts of conversations by then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Snooping on Partners

Short's statement, which sparked a vehement reaction at the time it was made, has now been confirmed for the first time by the NSA. According to an internal document, the intelligence results had a key influence on "American negotiating tactics at the UN" in connection with the Iraq War. Thanks to the intercepted conversations, the NSA was allegedly able to inform the US State Department and the American Ambassador to the UN with a high degree of certainty that the required majority had been secured before the vote was held on the corresponding UN resolution.

Snooping on negotiating partners is so rewarding that the NSA engages in this activity around the world, and not just on its home turf. There are secret eavesdropping posts in 80 US embassies and consulates around the world, internally referred to as the "Special Collection Service" (SCS) and jointly operated with the CIA.

The presence of these spying units ranks among the agency's best-guarded secrets. After all, they are politically precarious: There are very few cases in which their use has been authorized by the local host countries.

The small SCS teams (motto: "Vigilantly keeping watch around the world") intercept communications in their host countries. The required antennas and dishes are usually disguised. According to the documents seen by SPIEGEL, such "concealed collection systems" as they are internally referred to at the NSA, can be hidden behind "roof maintenance sheds" on embassy buildings. Highly classified technical surveillance operations in diplomatic missions such as embassies and consulates are referred to internally in the NSA under the codename "Stateroom."

The SCS teams are often disguised as diplomats and their actual mission is "not known by the majority of the diplomatic staff." According to the Snowden documents, such an SCS branch exists in Frankfurt, another one in Vienna. The existence of bugging units in embassies and consulates is to be kept secret under all circumstances, as it says in the material: If it were leaked, this would "cause serious harm to relations between the US and a foreign government."

'Thou Shalt Not Get Caught'

With few exceptions, this electronic eavesdropping not only contravenes the diplomatic code, but also international agreements. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946, as well as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, long ago established that no espionage methods are to be used. What's more, the US and the UN signed an agreement in 1947 that rules out all undercover operations.

But even in UN circles a little bit of spying has always been viewed as a minor offense and, according to statements made by former government employees, the Americans have never paid much attention to the agreements. But this could change with the revelations of US spying on the EU. "The US has violated the 11th commandment of our profession," says a high-ranking US intelligence official: "Thou shalt not get caught."

The spying scandal has strained relations between the trans-Atlantic partners more than any other security-policy issue in recent history. The espionage is "absolutely unacceptable," French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius inveighed after it became known that the French embassy in Washington was also on the surveillance list. "We cannot negotiate on a large trans-Atlantic market if there is the slightest suspicion that our partners are spying on the offices of our chief negotiator," European Commissioner for Justice Viviane Reding angrily said.

Even a conservative politician like the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the European Parliament in Brussels, Elmar Brok -- a member of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) -- spoke of an "enormous loss of trust." Other parliamentarians have threatened to pressure the US by suspending talks on a free trade agreement, and an EU delegation has traveled to Washington and confronted the Americans with the allegations.

Clean?

The talks are scheduled to resume in September. The litmus test will be whether the American government is prepared to offer the EU a no-spy agreement similar to the one that is currently being negotiated with the German government -- and in which both contracting partners pledge not to spy on each other.

Such an agreement can of course also be violated, but it would at least offer the Europeans a modicum of protection. For the Americans, it would mean renouncing exclusive inside views of the EU. It remains to be seen whether the Obama administration is prepared to take this step, despite the president's solemn statements that the surveillance focuses on counter-terrorism. A spokeswoman for the White House told SPIEGEL that the American government will respond to the allegations "via diplomatic channels," adding: "We have made it clear that we gather intelligence abroad just like any other nation."

On Monday of last week, the elevator stopped on the 26th floor of the EU's building on Third Avenue in New York. Press officer Matthews led the way through the delegation's working area, located high above the East River. Those seeking access to this zone must pass through checkpoints consisting of a number of doors made of bulletproof glass. Each door only opens after the door that has just been passed through is locked. A few meters further on, on the right, is the server room, where red lights are blinking. The security systems are new and were just installed over the past few weeks after SPIEGEL first reported on attempts to spy on the EU. The EU has launched an investigation, prompting technicians to search for bugs and check the computer network.

In September, America's Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power will visit the EU offices. The American-European free trade agreement will be on the agenda -- but also the espionage affair.

If the European security experts do everything right, it could be that -- for the first time in a long time -- the Americans won't know what to expect.


Original article: In Spegel online By Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark
Posted by: Pez
« on: 12. December 2013., 10:50:18 »

This is a few related google translate articles about this from the big Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet that also refer to the other big newspaper in Sweden Expressen. The reference link is to the Swedish untranslated articles en the newspapers web site.

"Russia rehearsed attack on FRA"

The Russian bomber that simulated an attack against Sweden on 29 March this year had a specific goal:
FRA's headquarters on Lovön outside Stockholm.
The conclusion drawn in the Armed Forces analysis of the acclaimed exercise, according to Expressen.


Early on March 29 of this year, two Russian bombers model Tu -22 , a dummy attack against Swedish goal. Shortly after midnight suddenly appeared six Russian fighter jets up in the Swedish Armed Forces' air monitoring.

- I can confirm that there were two bombers - Tu -22 with fighter escort of Su-27 aircraft , said Lieutenant-General Anders Silwer to SvD then.

The bomber , which can carry cruise missiles and nuclear weapons, should have focused on the Stockholm area and Southern Sweden - goals are two of Sweden's most important military installations, according to SvD's sources.

Had FRA as goal

After the attack exercise became known , the Armed Forces refused to talk about the specific goals that the Russian plan had . But according to data to Expressen , these are about FRA's headquarters on Lovön outside Stockholm .

- It was about FRA, practicing bombing Lovön . After Musts ( Military Intelligence and Security Service, editor's note ) analyzed the sequence of events came to that conclusion , says a source in the Armed Forces to Expressen .

According to the magazine data have also been presented to the Swedish Government. But the Swedish military would not confirm details .

- We have really no reason to comment on data from Expressen said Richard Kjaergaard , officer in charge of Communications at the Armed Forces.

But can you confirm or deny the reports ?

- That said, we can not confirm or deny unnamed data from Expressen . It is left for them , he says.

The base for reconnaissance against Russia

It is from Lovön that FRA conducts signals intelligence against including Russian goal. SVT's Mission Review (Uppdrag Granskning) revealed Thursday that the FRA has long been spying on Russia after having taken note of the documents leaked by the whistle- blower Edward Snowden . The information should then be shared with the American secret NSA.

In a document of April 18 this year says:

" NSA's cooperation with the FRA, an extraordinarily skilled, technically innovative and reliable partner , continues to grow. FRA gave the NSA access to their collected data cable 2011 and provided thus unique data on high-priority Russian goal , "writes SVT.

Aftonbladet has sought Defense Minister Karin Enstrom for comment.

Original article in Swedish: Aftonbladet  2013-12-09 Björn Barr   




Russian plane rehearsed attack on Sweden

Over view map of the incident with Swedish comment

Middle of the night simulated Russian bomber attack on the Stockholm and southern Sweden.
The exercise took place on Good Friday outside Gotska Sandon, reveals Swedish Dagbladet today.
Two Danish NATO Plane lifted from Lithuania and shadowed the Russian aircraft at a distance - but no Swedish fighter planes were on standby.


The incident during the early hours of Good Friday, March 29 has been kept secret for almost a month .

Today, however, reveals Swedish Dagbladet how the Russian military train to attack targets in Sweden .

After midnight, suddenly appeared six Russian fighter jets up in the Swedish Armed Forces' air monitoring. The aircraft from bases in the St. Petersburg region would usually cross the Gulf of Finland and east of the archipelago and then swerve to the south.

That night swung plan in place against Sweden .

- I can confirm that there were two bombers - Tu -22 with fighter escort of Su-27 aircraft , said Lieutenant-General Anders Silwer to SvD.

At two o'clock in the night were the two bombers and four fighters outside Gotska Sandon , three or four mil from Swedish territory , the newspaper said .

At The approach against Sweden shared the six plan into two Tater and conducted simulated attacks against certain Swedish goal, according to SvD's military sources.

Missing preparedness

The bomber , which can carry cruise missiles and nuclear weapons, targeted the Stockholm area and Southern Sweden - goals are two of Sweden's most important military installations, according to SvD's sources.

Lieutenant-General Anders Silwer , Defence Forces operation manager, would not comment on details of the drill targets but says to SvD

- They stayed in international airspace at Gotska Sandon and implemented some form of exercise. Then they turned back the way they had come.

The exercise received the alarm going at NATO sent up two Danish F16s stationed in Lithuania. They never had time to catch up with the Russian fighter planes but shaded them from a distance.

But Sweden lacked preparedness. Neither aircraft or pilots were ready for a sustained effort Friday night , writes SvD.

- No, we did not plan in incident preparedness , says Anders Silwer to the newspaper.

Sweden should really have a response capability where two Gripens should be ready to start to identify and document the alien plan. And be prepared to reject intruders.

Preparedness should be every day , but how many hours are secret.

" Reminiscent of the Cold War "

Russia held exercises at Easter was rewritten by including a Russian news agency , yet had not Sweden increased preparedness. As a "normal good ," according to Anders Silwer .

- The idea of ​​incident preparedness is to show the other state , " we see you, we meet you, we have an eye on you." Here was apparently no contingency and track . It is serious , a source said to SvD .

The newspaper said the incident " is reminiscent of the Soviet Union's actions during the Cold War ," then attack aircraft could fly straight towards the Swedish air bases to suddenly turn fully on before the Swedish border.

After not having flown with bombers over the Baltic Sea since the 1990s, Russians began again in 2011 - but then in the daytime.

The Russian plan must also have practiced attacks against American targets in the Pacific and a radar station in Japan in late February this year.


Original article in Swedish: Aftonbladet   2013-04-22 Niklas Eriksson
Posted by: Pez
« on: 12. December 2013., 10:05:36 »

Russia Simulated A Large-Scale Aerial Night Attack On Sweden

Erik Arnberg, a reader of The Aviationist, brought to my attention an episode that occurred on the night of Mar. 29, 2013, when Russian military aircraft simulated a large scale bomb run on Sweden.

The episode got a lot of media attention among the Swedish media outlets on Apr. 22, when more details about the simulated attack surfaced.

According to the Svenska Dagbladet, after midnight on Mar. 29 (Good Friday), the Swedish radars detected six fast planes coming from the east, originating from the St. Petersburg area and overflying the Gulf of Finland.

In reality, the route the aircraft were flying wasn't suspect: Russian bombers periodically fly across the Baltic Sea to reach the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, located between Lithuania and Poland.

However, on Mar. 29, the two Tu-22M3 Backfire heavy bombers, capable of carrying cruise missiles and nuclear weapons, and their four Su-27 Flanker fighter jets escort got dangerously close to the Swedish airspace and, at 2 AM local time, they skirted Gotland island, some 30-40 kilometers off the Swedish territorial waters.

After they carried out their mock attacks (on targets in the Stockholm area and Southern Sweden, according to Swedish military sources who talked to Svenska Dagbladet) they turned back and returned towards Russia.

The episode is similar to those Soviet Union exercises typical of the Cold War, when bombers carrying the traditional Red Star flew quite close to the Swedish airspace boundaries and got caught by Swedish interceptors. Such “visits” ended in 1992 but returned in 2011 when Putin resumed the long-range flights of its strategic bombers.

Although some Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers flew over the Baltic Sea in the last year, what’s unusual in Mar. 29 incident is that the Russian activity took place at night and, above all, it found the Swedish Air Force totally unprepared.

At least two JAS-39 Gripen should always be in a QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) and ready for take off in case of alarm, but quite surprisingly there were no interceptors ready on Good Friday night.

However, since 2004, NATO has a QRA detachment in Lithuania’s First Air Base in Zokniai/Šiauliai International Airport, whose aim is to guard the airspace over the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The task is shared by several NATO members; since Jan. 2013, the Baltic air policing task is assigned to the Royal Danish Air Force.

On Mar. 29, two RDAF F-16 fighter jets took off from Siuliai to shadow the Russian bombers and fighters from distance as the formation headed east towards Russia.

Analysts believe the massive restructuring process that downsized the Swedish Air Force — from 20 squadrons and over 400 planes to four divisions and less than 150 planes — is to blame for the lack of preparedness of the Swedish air defense.

For sure the Russian military activity didn’t come unannounced. As said, it was neither the first time nor will be the last to see Moscow’s bombers, fighter jets performing simulated attacks on strategic targets around the world.

On Feb. 26 and 27, after Russian Tu-95 had skirted Guam airbase, Tu-22M Backfires simulated strikes on a U.S. Aegis cruiser in the Pacific and ground-based radar station in Japan.

And, in the future, Russia could detach its advanced, stealth PAK-DA, destined to replace the current aging fleet of 63 Tu-95 Bear and 13 Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers.

Sweden, Japan and U.S. you’d better be prepared.

This post originally appeared at The Aviationist. Copyright 2013. Follow The Aviationist on Twitter.

CHECK OUT:  Russia's fourth-generation jet fighter could be the best thing in on the market

Original article: David Cenciotti, The Aviationist, Apr. 23, 2013, 4:26 PM

Posted by: Pez
« on: 12. December 2013., 09:47:31 »

As Swedish, I have known it for some time already. It has been published in the Swedish press in the past week. But it has not been published in English before, so it has been difficult to provide references to this in the past because it is so controversial.

Their is also a rumour in the Swedish press that the "simulated" Air strike from Russia in 29 mars 2013 was a training / deterrent attack against Swedish signals intelligence agency FRA headquarter on an island "Lovön" in the Stockholm archipelago.

More about the Russian "simulated" Air strike below. But I have not find anything yet in English translation about that it had the Swedish FRA headquarter as the target.
Posted by: Samker
« on: 11. December 2013., 17:45:57 »

...

(Reuters) - Sweden has been a key partner for the United States in spying on Russia, Swedish television reported on Thursday, citing leaked documents from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).

Swedish television said it had obtained the documents from Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who brought NSA contractor Edward Snowden's leaks about mass surveillance by the agency to world attention.

...

Who would assume this... I am very surprised, of course negatively. :thumbsdown:

Thanks P.
Posted by: Pez
« on: 11. December 2013., 10:55:28 »

Sweden key partner for U.S. spying on Russia: TV



An undated aerial handout photo shows the National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters building in Fort Meade, Maryland.


(Reuters) - Sweden has been a key partner for the United States in spying on Russia, Swedish television reported on Thursday, citing leaked documents from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).

Swedish television said it had obtained the documents from Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who brought NSA contractor Edward Snowden's leaks about mass surveillance by the agency to world attention.

Greenwald tweeted on Thursday that the close relationship between the United States and Sweden could not be "overstated" and that this was the first of many revelations to come.

Earlier this year, Snowden leaked details of a global spying program by the NSA, stirring international criticism. The U.S. has said much of the information was a result of cooperation with other intelligence services.

Swedish television cited a document dated April 18 saying Sweden's National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), which conducts electronic communications surveillance, had helped in providing the United States with information on Russia.

"The FRA provided NSA ... a unique collection on high-priority Russian targets, such as leadership, internal politics," it quoted the document saying.

Sweden's defence minister said on Thursday that it cooperates with some other countries but does not say which.

"It is very important to have a defence intelligence cooperation so that we can keep track of external threats to Swedish interests," Karin Enstrom told Swedish news agency TT.

"That we cooperate is something very natural. We build our security in cooperation with other countries and other organizations."

In a separate document, high level NSA employees were told to "thank Sweden for its continued work on the Russian target, and underscore the primary role that FRA plays as a leading partner to work the Russian target, including Russian leadership … and … counterintelligence."

Snowden is in Russia, where he was granted asylum in August for at least a year.

(Reporting by Simon Johnson and Mia Shanley; Editing by Ralph Boulton and Catherine Evans)


Original article: STOCKHOLM  Thu Dec 5, 2013 11:02am EST
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